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Abstract 
How effective are systems of transparency, such as Freedom of Information (FOI) requests? 
The ambitious aims of FOI laws hinge on whether requests produce the desired information 
for the citizens or groups that use them. The question is whether such legally mandated requests 
work better than more informal mechanisms. Despite the high hopes of advocates, 
organisational routines, lack of awareness or resistance may limit legal access and public 
bodies may seek to comply minimally rather than behave in concordance with the spirit of the 
law. This paper reports a field experiment that compared FOI requests and informal non-legal 
asks to assess which is more effective in accessing information from English parish councils. 
The basic premise of statutory access is borne out. FOI requests are more effective than simple 
asks and the size or pre-existing level of openness of a body appears to make little difference 
to their responsiveness. FOI requests are more effective in encouraging bodies to do more than 
the law asks (concordance) than encouraging more minimal levels of legal co-operation, when 
a body simply fulfils its obligations to varying degrees (compliance). This finding indicates 
high levels of support for FOI once it is within the system.  
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Introduction 
If we do not yet live in a transparent society we at least are in a time of unparalleled openness 
(Birchall 2014). Transparency is now a central tenet of democratic societies and, it is hoped, a 
vehicle for increased citizen oversight of government (Hood 2010; Grimmelikhuijsen and 
Meijer 2012). Citizens now have numerous means to access better quality information through 
a mixture of regulations and voluntary disclosures, ranging from sector based targeted 
transparency mechanisms and open data, all built around wide-ranging access to information 
laws. In the United Kingdom for example, the centrepiece of the numerous transparency 
reforms is the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000, which mandates a general right to 
request information from public bodies, subject to exclusions. Together, these laws and 
regulations create a growing transparency ecosystem (Kreimer 2008). As well as providing 
information, it is hoped that such systems can have a transformative effect on the health of 
democratic systems, triggering a wide array of instrumental benefits that range from greater 
accountability to increased trust (Fenster 2015). 
Much rests on whether FOI systems actually work and are superior as information 
gathering devices to alternative methods. FOI laws, known elsewhere as Right to Information 
or Access to Information laws, entrench a public right to request information within a set 
timeline (20 working days in the UK), subject to a set of restrictions or exemptions, with an 
independent appeal mechanism for complaints. Laws often enshrine both pro-active 
publication, for example of meeting minutes or spending, and the requirement that bodies 
respond to requests from users. In the UK, the legislation now sits alongside laws regulating 
access to meetings and environmental information, and a broad array of online data published 
as part of the UK’s Open Data initiative (Cabinet Office 2013). The hope of many reformist 
governments is that an array of such tools will cause a chain reaction, leading to successively 
greater levels of openness. This claim relies not only on the legal force of the law but also on 
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the agency giving priority to an information request as a result of internalising this norm into 
its organisational procedures (Burt and Taylor 2010). The underlying research question is 
whether an agency is more responsive to legally-mandated requests for information than a 
simple non-binding ask.  
The question might at first seem to be naïve, given the clear legal framework of FOI 
and the evidence of support for the principles of openness across bureaucracies, whether 
motivated through fear of non-compliance or support for the ideal of openness. However there 
are circumstances in which public authorities might be unwilling or unable to reply to even a 
legally mandated request. In the regulation literature there has been a large amount of 
consideration of the extent to which public authorities may resist information requests by those 
outside (Bardach and Kagan 1982). Recent criticisms by politicians have painted FOI regimes 
as misused, abused or subject to counter-productive effects (Blair 2011; Raag/CES 2014; 
Independent Commission 2015). Research has also pointed to the fragility of the requesting 
process, which can be undermined by resource constraints, street-level divergence and, at the 
far end of the scale, outright adversarialism and resistance (Roberts 2015; Bauhr and Grimes 
2014). Once within the system, requests may be subject to entropy, resistance or attention decay 
as they move through complex or unseen internal processes (Meijer 2014; Snell 2001).  
This paper aims to test whether and under what conditions local government is more 
responsive to an FOI request than to an informal ask for information. Simply measuring 
quantitatively the numbers of responses might overstate the supply of information (Snell 2001: 
OSJI 2006). To measure effectiveness, the posing of an FOI request needs to be compared with 
a non-legal or informal ask, which can only be done in a field trial. With a few notable 
exceptions (Lewis and Wood 2012), tests of the responsiveness to information requests remain 
relatively rare.  
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Our findings show that overall FOI requests are more effective than informal asks and 
that the size or pre-existing level of openness of the targeted local authority makes little 
difference to responsiveness. A crucial distinction lies between various degrees of legal 
compliance and broader concordance. Compliance with the law means putting in place 
processes designed to meet the basic legal requirements, such as the creation of publication 
schemes or systems to answer requests. This can be done to different degrees of sophistication 
and with very different amounts of enthusiasm (Burt and Taylor 2009). This array of minimal 
approaches can be set against concordance, a wider willingness to work with ‘the spirit of the 
intentions of the FOI Act’ by moving beyond a legalistic approach to embrace the broader 
principle of being open (Richter and Wilson 2013, 181). Findings show that FOI requests 
trigger more concordance than compliance, in relative terms.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: the first section reviews the literature on 
transparency and the effectiveness of FOI; it then sets out the research site, explains the 
experimental design, reports results and finally discusses the implications of the findings for 
transparency initiatives. 
Transparency and Freedom of Information: Transformative or Trapped? 
The debate around the impact of transparency is divided between transparency optimists, who 
point to the positive benefits, and pessimists, who highlight the political and logistical obstacles 
to making any system truly work (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014). For the optimists, FOI 
carries intrinsic, normative benefits and positive instrumental repercussions that make it 
superior to any informal channel (Heald 2006; Hood 2006). First, on a symbolic level, the mere 
presence of FOI legislation can compel legal compliance out of either simple obedience to the 
law or support for the principle of openness. Research across a number of FOI regimes have 
pointed towards consistent bureaucratic support for the abstract ideal of greater openness 
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(Meijer et al. 2012; Kimball 2012; Hazell et al. 2010; Sharma 2015). Second, FOI laws are 
accompanied by a machinery of enforcement, including a statutory duty to ‘advise and assist’ 
requesters and an independent appeal system which, though it deals with only a small 
percentage of all cases, has a powerful influence in ruling and policing the law (Hazell et al. 
2010). Finally, the fear of damaging secrecy scandals and anxiety over the consequences of 
non-compliance may negatively motivate bodies towards greater openness, especially ‘where 
information management techniques are apt to be portrayed as excessive secrecy or cover-ups’ 
(Snell 2001, 188). This mixture of gradual institutionalisation, support and pressure creates a 
positive dynamic, increasingly formalising procedures for making more information available 
and, by setting precedents, encouraging officials to be more inclined to provide it in the future 
(Prat 2006; Bauhr and Grimes 2014). According to optimists, in this way FOI eventually 
triggers a growing concordance that moves, over time, beyond simple compliance to legal 
rules. In such a ‘virtuous cycle of transparency’ sustained popular efforts to monitor public 
officials could lead to ‘mobilization, accountability...and institutional reform’ that would then 
serve to improve ‘the quality of government’ (Bauhr and Grimes 2014, 295).  
Pessimists present a series of counters to this positive picture. FOI sits across 
overlapping bureaucratic, legal and political dimensions that can make operation problematic 
(Terrill 2000; Snell 2001: Fenster 2015). The first pessimistic counter-argument concerns the 
strength of the process itself and the capacity of institutions. The program logic of FOI between 
request and answer is long and ‘there are many points at which the necessary sequence of 
events could break down’ as requests could go unanswered, ignored or be delayed (Roberts 
2015, 3). Bauhr and Grimes (2014, 295) point out that the idea of a smooth process of 
requesting, disclosure and positive outcomes is highly idealised and the links in parts of the 
chain are tenuous. Problems around administrative capacity can also seriously undermine the 
operation and any consequent benefits (Roberts 2012; 2015). The knowledge and availability 
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of staff with the resources to deal with requests is crucial to the success of any FOI law is. In a 
number of countries a lack of trained personnel or resources have simply starved and 
gridlocked FOI systems (Roberts 2012; Snell 2001). 
Second, uncertainty over the process is compounded by a lack of knowledge about 
exactly what happens inside organisations: when a body receives a request it enters a black box 
(Meijer 2014). The exact response of an agency to a request may depend on the context and 
the issue at stake (Piotrowksi 2010; Welch 2012; Wilson 2015). Institutional reaction can vary 
from enthusiastic embrace through grudging compliance to outright resistance (Pasquier and 
Villenueve 2007; Kimball 2012). This reaction in turn may then determine the strength of 
response to the request, and the extent to which any FOI maintains momentum through the 
organizational chain or is lost to entropy and attention decay (Roberts 2015).  
Table 1 draws on the debate between optimists and pessimists and previous research to 
set out a series of possible responses to information requests and the type of ‘information 
behaviour’ associated with each. The distinction hinges upon a difference between various 
types of compliance (doing as the law asks to varying degrees) and concordance (behaving in 
ways that move beyond the law and doing more than it asks). 
Table 1: Responses to Information Requests and Information Behaviours 
Response Type Definition Information Behaviour 
Non-Compliance Lack of adherence to the law No response to an 
information request 
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Lesser Compliance Some attempt to comply with the 
law  
Generic answer or simply 
reply with no or non-
specific information  
Partial Compliance Systematic compliance with the 
law but sometimes ad hoc or 
informal 
A partial response to the 
information request 
Full Compliance Creation of procedures and 
systems, work to legal rules, strict 
fulfilling of legal obligations, with 
a technocratic, rational approach 
aimed at ‘front office 
performance’ 
Minimal obedience to 
request detail, answering to 
maximum time limit, 
compliance e.g. existence of 
publication schemes 
Concordance Support and embrace of principles 
beyond legal requirements, 
working towards  the ‘spirit’ of 
the law 
 
Pro-active disclosure of 
information 
(Adapted from Richter and Wilson 2013, Burt and Taylor 2009) 
In terms of measuring the outcomes between FOI requests and asks, evidence of 
compliance would find stronger differences in responsiveness at the minimal levels of 
compliance in terms of non, lesser or partial compliance (Richter and Wilson 2013, Burt and 
Taylor 2009). Greater concordance for the principles of the law would find greater differences 
for higher levels and actions that embraces the spirit of the law around promoting greater 
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openness and public access (Richter and Wilson 2013; Bauhr and Grimes 2014).  Table 2 below 
sets out how we incorporate these measures into the analysis. 
It is not clear to what extent FOI regimes move from compliance to concordance over 
time. The relatively short life-span of most FOI regimes mean there are few longitudinal 
analyses of behaviour change. Roberts’ (1998) examination of more than a decade of regional 
state-level Canadian access laws found difficulties around poor compliance, resistance and 
adversarialism, reinforced by inadequate resourcing and deficient record-keeping. Snell’s 
exploration of  Australian state level laws identified a cycle of optimism giving way to a 
pessimism, with the operation of laws shaped by a similar lack of ‘administrative compliance’ 
and a ‘disappointing return on democratic dividends’ (2001, 343). Looking at South African 
local government, Berliner (2015) concluded that the operation was severely limited by poor 
resources and a lack of external monitoring, though political competition acted as a spur.  
Across the literature, the question of whether FOI works, and how it develops over 
time, remains open. Optimists claim transparency laws trigger a virtuous cycle of transparency 
as recipients internalize openness and transparency norms. FOI laws then become part of the 
organizational culture of recipients as bodies move from compliance to concordance (Richter 
and Wilson 2013). Pessimists question the operability of the complex chain of a request and 
point to the political and resource obstacles that can undermine the system and stymie any 
hoped for effects.   
The Experimental Site: Local Democratic Government in England 
District and county councils, the primary units of local government in England, are estimated 
to be the recipients of somewhere between 70 and 80 per cent of all FOI requests since the Act 
was implemented in 2005 (Worthy 2013: Worthy and Hazell 2016). Local government has 
been praised for its efficiency and support for FOI amid growing volumes of requests and 
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severe budget cuts (Justice 2012; Richter and Wilson 2013). So far, research suggests FOI 
processes have begun to change information flows and norms, though the precise internal 
systems vary from formalised procedures to relatively ad hoc approaches (Richter and Wilson 
2013: Burt and Taylor 2009). English local authorities are held to be generally transparent and 
accountable, with FOI now forming one part of an array of surveillance and regulatory 
mechanisms keeping them in check (Worthy 2015).1 In 2014, for example, central government 
reforms allowed filming and use of social media during council meetings while successive 
transparency codes have pushed proactive publication of spending and contract data (House of 
Commons Library 2014).     
Local parish and town councils, which operate as the lowest democratic unit of local 
government, were chosen as the focus for requests for a number of reasons. 2 First, they are 
numerous and the nearly 10,000 councils across England offered a wide sample, an important 
consideration given the anticipated low response rates to the FOI request and ask (House of 
Commons Library 2014a; Pearce and Ellwood 2002). Second, unlike other parts of local 
government many parishes appear relatively untouched by FOI (Hunt 2010). This meant, on a 
practical level, there was less risk of any requests being caught amid the increasing volumes 
found in other public bodies or slowed by the involvement of legal teams or strategies designed 
to delay or mitigate fallout of the kind seen in more politicised and experienced organisations 
(Lewis and Wood 2012; Burt and Taylor 2009).  Finally, parishes represent an important case 
study with the potential, on the one hand, for streel-level divergence as bodies furthest from 
                                                             
1 For the purposes of the study the focus is upon England. Responsibility for the administration of local government in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland lies with the respective devolved bodies. In the case of Scotland, there is a separate 
Freedom of Information Act, the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 and the Scottish equivalent of parish councils, 
called Communities, have no statutory power.  
2 Legally speaking no difference is present between parish and town councils. The latter simply serve a town, though town 
councils are held to be generally larger than parishes. 
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the centre and oversight but, on the other, as agencies on the democratic frontline and closest 
to the public.  
Compared with other parts of the UK political system little is known about parish 
councils (Pearce and Ellwood 2002). They are the lowest unit of local government in the UK, 
long established systems located at the town or village level that date back to the middle ages. 
They primarily cover rural areas and deal with local environmental, community and amenity 
issues, with additional discretionary powers over raising tax via a small precept (Wilson and 
Game 2011; House of Commons Library 2014a). It is estimated there are some 9,500 councils 
and 95,000 councillors across England, covering approximately 30% of the population, 
normally over areas with a density of less than 10,000 people (House of Commons Library 
2014; Pearce and Ellwood 2002). Recent governments have encouraged the creation of new 
parishes and offered increased powers in a bid to drive grassroots democratic renewal (House 
of Commons Library 2014a; Pearce and Ellwood 2002). This renewal reflects the desire of 
successive governments to decentralise more activities to the lowest elected democratic unit 
and re-energise local communities (Ellwood et al 2000; John 2014). Despite this renewed 
democratic emphasis there has been no increase in resources. 
Beyond this any information about the detailed role and operation of parishes is scarce 
and they have been described as the ‘Cinderella’ of local democracy (Pearce and Ellwood 2002; 
Briggs 2011). There is no central database on parish councils in England so very little is known 
about the composition or structure of individual bodies. Generally parishes vary in their size, 
in their use of powers and even their composition, as some appear to have a greater proportion 
of elected councillors, while others are reliant on co-option when elections fail to supply 
sufficient candidates-though what data exists on levels of co-option are incomplete (Briggs 
2011). Party politics appears to be rare as, when last measured in 2002, only 10 per cent of 
councillors declared a party affiliation and only 4 per cent of parish councils were run on party 
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lines, though again there is no recent data (Pearce and Ellwood 2002). The public is fairly 
indifferent to participation in parish politics, in either the polls or the annual public meetings 
each parish must hold by law (Pearce and Ellwood 2002; Briggs 2011). 
Parishes and FOI 
Parish councils are covered by FOI as well as other openness laws and regulations. 
Under FOI, all bodies must have a publication scheme, a publically available document which 
details the standardised information that is to be made proactively available (House of 
Commons Library 2014). Other informational duties and obligations outside of FOI includes 
annual public meetings (a statutory requirement), the publication of minutes and agendas 
(either online or via a public noticeboard) and the right, should the populace wish, to hold a 
poll on parish issues, though these are rare due to lack of resources (Pearce and Ellwood 2002). 
In addition, parish councils with a gross income above £25,000 must comply with the Local 
Government Transparency Code revised in 2015 covering the publication of spending over 
£500, organisation charts, and senior salaries (DCLG 2015). There exists a ‘draft lighter-touch 
transparency code’ covering audit, expenditure and councillor responsibilities of those parishes 
with income under £25,000 (House of Commons Library 2014a). Little is known about the 
extent to which these codes, that carry at present a quasi-legal force, are understood or being 
adhered to and there is no centralised data on parish income to measure which parishes fall into 
what category.  
The effect of FOI on other parts of UK government have been studied in considerable 
detail. Research has been conducted at central government level (Hazell et al. 2010: Worthy 
and Hazell 2016) at the higher reaches of local government in England (Worthy 2013; 
Chapman and Hunt 2013; Richter and Wilson 2013) in the separate regime in Scotland (Taylor 
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and Burt 2009: 2010) as well as on particular institutions such as Parliament (Hazell et al. 
2012). There is almost no data on the effect of FOI at the parish level (see Hunt 2010).  
Parishes are at the centre of local networks, acting as channels for both receiving and 
disseminating information (Pearce and Ellwood 2002). The traditional characterisation of 
parish politics is of councillors being contacted by telephone or in the street, shop or bar rather 
than via formal mechanisms such as FOI (Hunt 2010). The only research into parish council 
transparency found that of the sample studied ‘none of the parish or town councils contacted 
had received any FOI requests’ and that, as seen elsewhere, clerks, who are in administrative 
charge of the parish and deal with FOI, were generally supportive of the ideals of the law but 
pressed for time and resources in practice, especially as some jointly run more than one parish 
council (Hunt 2010, 50). The last attempt to monitor publication of minutes found only a third 
of parishes complying, though this was far back in 1991 (Pearce and Ellwood 2002).   
Consequently, how parishes react to the arrival of FOI is unclear. Outside of their legal 
obligations, parishes are more naturally reliant on local informal information networks (Hunt 
2010). The proximity of parishes to citizens, within the same village or community, may make 
for stronger pressures for openness than a large-scale organisation, with less room for delay or 
resistance-as shown below attempts to avoid requests for information could become 
problematic (BBC 2013). However, parish councils are also far from the reach of regulation or 
monitoring, and this, combined with meagre resources, few staff and a lack of use, may make 
compliance low (Hunt 2010). For parishes openness may also be easier but the politics may be 
more intenseas in 2012 when a parish council resigned on mass over a stream of FOI requests 
following claims of the local community being excluded from meetings on new housing 
development (BBC 2012; BBC 2013). In such controversial and unusual cases, how a parish 
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reacts to FOI may depend very much on its local context, though randomisation in the 
experiment reduces the effect of local context. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses  
By building on the literature reviewed above, we test experimentally whether parish councils 
are more responsive to an FOI request than an informal ask for information. We also test for a 
series of relevant factors, namely prior transparency, openness, and size, which could influence 
the responsiveness to a request and then examine whether FOI is more effective at various 
levels of compliance or in concordance, as defined in Table 1. In so doing, we offer an insight 
as to where FOI sits in relation to the competing claims of optimists and pessimists. 
Hypothesis 1:  Local authorities will be more responsive to an FOI request than to an informal 
ask 
As outlined above, FOI laws should carry more force than a simple ask. Various studies 
have pointed towards widespread support for the principles of FOI and openness among 
officials (Hazell et al. 2010; Richter and Wilson 2013). This may also be compounded by the 
fear of the consequences of non-response, whether through personal blame or criticism from 
oversight bodies. Whether it is the symbolism, principled support or fear of the consequences 
of not complying, it is likely that FOI carries a greater power to create a response than an 
informal request.  
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Hypothesis 2: Local authorities with an FOI publication scheme or with published budgets and 
minutes will be more responsive to an information request 3 
Not all public bodies begin from the same level of openness. In the UK local 
government had long been a laboratory for openness experiments of various kinds. Overall, 
local authorities have dealt better and more efficiently with a larger volume of FOI requests 
than central government (Justice 2012). The presence of a mandated publication scheme or the 
publication of statutory information can be taken as proxy of awareness. This is, however, only 
an approximate measure as research has shown how the schemes at all levels of government 
are subject to minimal compliance and neglect. As a somewhat analogue age device in an age 
of search engines, they are rarely used by the public and rarely updated by public bodies (see 
Hazell et al. 2010; Worthy 2013).  
Previous research points to the fact that bodies with greater experience of transparency 
are better placed to move from formal procedure to embedded norms. In the UK, local 
government’s long history of statutory openness has made it better able to deal with FOI 
(Worthy 2013). Local authorities have been recognized as a site of innovation and 
experimentation, moving beyond compliance through` greater proactive disclosure and a series 
of innovations such as online searchable request logs (Richter and Wilson 2013). Political 
make-up appears to have little effect on an authority’s attitude to FOI, though any such political 
effects are more complex in parishes, given that members can be co-opted and parishes are 
much less overtly political  (Worthy 2013: Pearce and Ellwood 2002).  
Hypothesis 3: Local authorities with larger population sizes will be more responsive than 
smaller authorities 
                                                             
3  The study design was registered at the Evidence in Government and Politics (EGAP) repository, 
http://egap.org/registration/764. Hypothesis 2 was added afterwards because of the availability of data on prior compliance 
that was not known about at the time of registration.  
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As well as the symbolic potential, the practical issues of whether there are sufficient 
resources, awareness or processes in place are key to whether a regime functions (Lewis and 
Wood 2012; Roberts 2015). Bodies with greater resources and more staff are likely to have a 
greater awareness and capacity to deal with any formal requests than those without.  
Previous Experiments with FOI 
FOI legislation has become a common tool for experimental designs, and has been used to 
examine both the impact on the institutions subject to it and the recipients of the information 
(Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014). Requests have been used to assess the effectiveness of 
transparency laws by making standardized requests across different regimes (OSJI 2006), 
different political institutions, such as in the EU Commission (Access Info Europe 2014) and 
in studies of multiple levels of government in, for example, India (RaaG/CES 2014) and Brazil 
(Michener and Rodrigez 2015). In the US Lewis and Wood (2012) sent a series of FOI requests 
to 132 US Federal agencies composed of one innocuous and one potentially sensitive question. 
They found that the greater the political accountability of an agency, the less its direct 
democratic accountability. They concluded that greater politicization led to less responsiveness 
to FOI, especially as, comparatively, agencies proved far more responsive to similar questions 
from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the Congressional 
committee which oversees Federal agencies. Research in New Zealand by Price (2005) using 
the Official Information Act found that the law worked well as a means of gathering 
information but there were serious issues around timing and quality of some responses.  
Other research has looked at the effects of identity and wording to test compliance. A study in 
Mexico used parallel requests from a non-descript and an ostensibly well connected family 
name to test for partiality in bureaucratic response (Lagunes 2006) and another in the US used 
a series of parallel aggressively and politely worded formulations to test the effectiveness of 
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different approaches (Cuillier 2010). Michener and Rodrigez (2015) also examined possible 
bias in responses to requests based on identity in Brazil. 
As well as measuring FOI regimes themselves, other studies have used requests to 
measure and initiate behavior change. A series of ground level randomized controlled trials 
(RCT) have drawn on India’s Right to Information (RTI) Act 2005 (Peisakhin and Pinto 2010; 
Peisakhin 2012; Bhatnagar and Jain 2013). One experiment used RTI requests to help process 
voting registration and found that the use of a request ‘results in dramatically faster processing 
times’ and is ‘almost as effective as bribery’ because officials feared non-compliance would 
hinder their career (Peisakhin 2012, 12). Another examined the link between access to 
information and corruption deterrence, highlighting the rather nuanced consequences across 
different groups of beneficiaries (Shankar et al. 2011). Experiments measuring transparency in 
different policy areas, via controlled exposure to varying levels of information, have found 
considerable differences in impact depending on the policy area, context or recipient 
(Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014; de Fine Licht 2014).  
Research Design 
The results and lessons from the studies above shaped this design. Across the experiments 
certain patterns are clear. First, the design relies on certain assumptions and ideas as to how the 
process works, which may not be reflected in the black box of varied institutional reactions 
(Michener and Rodrigez 2015; Lewis and Wood 2012; Price 2006). Second, response rates are 
almost always either low or very low and, within this, the quality of response and timing can 
be poor (Cuillier 2010; Michener and Rodrigez 2015).  
We use a randomized controlled trial to test whether local parish councils are more 
responsive to an FOI request than an informal ask. Parish councils were sent either an FOI 
request or an informal ask for the organization chart of the parish council. The choice of an 
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organisation chart reflected the UK government’s emphasis on publishing basic organisational 
information that could serve as building blocks to create a better understanding of government. 
An organization chart was defined as a list of councillors with names and responsibilities (at 
very least specifying who is the Chair and the Vice-Chair within a body). It was chosen as a 
relatively innocuous and piece of information easily accessible by the public body (Lewis and 
Wood 2012). It was hoped that the publication would have a democratic benefit for local 
residents and would require minimal resources to carry out.  
The request consisted of two separate parts: parishes were asked to provide the 
information required in compliance with FOI rules, and then asked to make that information 
publicly available, a step beyond what FOI rules demand, towards concordance.  
Sample 
We sent via email an FOI request, labelled as such, to the treatment group and a standard 
informal request stating explicitly it was not an FOI to the control group. These were sent to 
4,300 English parish councils drawn from 19 English counties, the organisational unit in which 
parishes are grouped (see Table A1 for a detailed breakdown in Appendix A). 4 The sample 
was large, given the expected low compliance and likelihood of a high number of potential lost 
requests due to blocking or error. Counties were selected on the basis of geographical spread, 
with the choice driven by the need to obtain a broadly equal dispersion across all of England 
at all four points of the compass. The selected counties encompassed Cornwall in the South 
West of England to Durham in the North West near the Scottish border, though some countries 
had to be excluded.5 The population density of each area was also variable, from 74 inhabitants 
per square kilometre in Cumbria to 324 in Staffordshire. As there was no centrally held single 
                                                             
4 Note that on the total of 5,023 parish councils sampled roughly 4,300 have functioning e-mail addresses and 
hence could be included in the experiment. 
5 Five English counties had to be excluded due to an ongoing experiment.  
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list of parish contact details, the list of parishes was drawn from the official websites of the 
relevant county councils and local districts. Several pieces of information for each parish were 
collected: the contact details of the clerk (normally an email rather than a physical address), 
the parish's website URL, and whether the FOI publication scheme, financial information, 
meeting minutes and the organization structure of the council were all publicly available. Parish 
council size was added as a control variable. Since this information was not available, we 
associated the value 0 to parish councils and the value 1 to town councils. Although some 
exceptions exist, the former are far smaller than the latter in terms of population.6  
Our sample represents roughly half of the population and is drawn from different counties in 
terms of population and geographical position (a detailed breakdown is provided in Table A1 
in Appendix A). Overall, 79 per cent of parishes either have a website or use a separate 
webpage that is part of a community/county website and 89 per cent publish a contact e-mail 
address. There was high variation in online presence between counties. In the county with the 
highest online presence more than 99 per cent of parish councils had a website and more than 
89 per cent a contact e-mail address, whereas in the county with the lowest only 47 per cent of 
parishes had web presence and 48 per cent displayed a contact e-mail address. This variation 
may be due to lack of resources and the fact that most staff are part time. 
Other studies of FOI point to support and awareness of the law as a good predictor of more 
open behaviour in the future: so past openness should predict current levels (Hazell et al 2010: 
Richter and Wilson 2013). Measuring this is problematic so a series of proxy measures were 
used, namely whether a parish already published a publication scheme and other data such as 
meetings or expenses (Hazell et al. 2010, ICO 2014). 16 per cent of the parishes sampled had 
                                                             
6 This information is available only for roughly half of the sample. We employed another proxy for size, namely 
the amount of council tax precepted on parish councils, available via the Department for Communities and Local 
Government. For this proxy, similarly, information is only available for half of the sample. 
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a publication scheme on their website, 25 per cent pro-actively published their expenses, 58 
per cent their meeting minutes and 10 per cent the organization chart. No high variation was 
found across counties in this case. In the best (worst) performing county 21 (12) per cent had 
a publication scheme, 63 (62) per cent published minutes, 10 (7) per cent already publish an 
organization chart and 34 (28) per cent detailed expenses on their websites.7 
Measures and Treatments 
Although FOI legislation is purportedly and legally ‘requester blind’, research has shown that 
bodies can react differently according to the identity, or perceived identity, of requesters 
(Cuillier 2010; Hazell et al 2010; Michener and Rodrigez 2015). The requests and asks were 
made from an NGO/campaign body called ‘Making Parishes Better Places’. 8  To avoid 
deception, it was branded as a collaboration between the named researchers and the NGO. The 
researchers believed in the objectives of the NGO and addresses and contact numbers were in 
evidence on the website: but it was also clear it was a research project. There was concern that 
if it were branded solely as a research project, it would bias responses positively, as awareness 
may encourage greater compliance, or alter responses in other ways. Given the sample size and 
power calculations, the likelihood of low response rate and concern that bodies respond 
differently to different requesters, we did not vary the identity as other studies have-though we 
would be keen to try this in future (Lagunes 2007; Cuillier 2010) 
Parish councils were block randomized within counties. We allocated the same 
treatment to parishes with shared clerks. Although multiple FOI request or asks did not 
constitute a problem, in order to avoid the situation where the same clerk receives an FOI and 
an informal ask, the randomization followed a clear procedure. All the observations were 
                                                             
7 Table A2 in Appendix A shows the results of the balance tests. 
8 Details available from the corresponding author. 
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collapsed to unique county-clerk values to obtain a sub-sample and the treatment was randomly 
allocated to 50 per cent of the observations within each county. The sub-sample was then 
merged with the initial one and each parish-county duplicate was associated to the value the 
respective unique parish-county received in the randomization before. The distribution 
between treatment and control group was then checked across counties and the overall sample.  
Clerks responsible for overseeing FOI or answer questions were asked to (i) send by 
email the organization chart of the parish council and (ii) to proactively publish this information 
either via their website or other medium, such as on a parish notice board/newsletter or notation 
in their meeting minutes (see Appendix B). A positive response to (i) would mean full 
compliance and to (ii) would be seen as evidence of concordance and transparency beyond 
what is legally required. Although such pro-active publication is not required by the law, the 
government’s Local Government Transparency Code highlights the need to publish certain 
data, and a reference was made to this (DCLG 2015). However, it is not known to what extent 
bodies are aware of the code or the extent to which it may influence behaviour (Worthy 2015). 
Distinguishing between an FOI and non-FOI request is problematic in the UK as requesters do 
not need to mention the law for it to be treated as such and discretion exists with the recipient. 
The ‘ask’ thus clearly stated that ‘this is not an FOI’.  
Measurement 
The emailing of the FOI requests and asks were managed via Qualtrics and the emails received 
back from the parish were manually coded. Requests and asks were sent on 2 June 2015 and 
the coding was conducted on a rolling basis. Only one email was sent with no follow up, though 
discussions were begun with some of the parishes that responded. This was in part due to lack 
of data beyond parish email addresses (i.e. physical location), and in part over the desire not to 
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be seen to be adding to what some claim is a ‘burden’ that answering FOI requests impose on 
public authorities (Justice 2012; Independent Commission on FOI 2015).   
Measuring and assessing responses to requests is difficult and nuanced, with different 
studies using varied approaches (see FOIA Project 2015; Darch 2013; OSJI 2006). Although 
the legal time period to reply to a FOI request is 20 working days, responses were coded up 
until the 1st August 2015, covering almost two months after the request. The coding was 
conducted by a single coder and then blind cross checking was carried out on a sub-sample: 
Cohen’s Kappa varies from 0.65 to 0.85, depending on whether the ordinal character of the 
coding is considered or not.  
Coding FOI responses is fraught with difficulty and involves clearly delineating what 
may be nuanced answers (OSJI 2006). Other research demonstrates the difficulty of precise 
categorisation of what can be a wide variety of responses (OSJI 2007: Cuillier 2010: Michener 
2015). For example, finding clear evidence for resistance or attempted non-compliance is 
problematic and assuming that a slow response equals resistance ignores the fact that delay is 
endemic to all FOI regimes and that smaller or less requested bodies generally have fewer 
resources and less experience with the practice of the law (Hazell and Worthy 2010). Before 
deciding on the coding frame numerous iterations were tried and tested, some of which proved 
too unwieldy and others too succinct. While no analyses is perfect, we felt that the code used 
came closest to serving as usable approach that combined brevity with sufficient flexibility to 
capture the nuance in response. The responses were coded on a five scale ordinal variable that 
could capture fairly the nuances of responses between a non-response and an answer of varying 
obligation and usefulness: Table 2 shows the coding scheme, making reference to the 
categories used in Table 1 above. 
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Table 2: Coding Scheme for Responses 
 0: No reply. We coded 0 those parish councils which did not reply to the request by email. 
[non-compliance] 
 1: Reply. We coded 1 those parish councils which replied to the request by email, but which 
did not provide the organization chart or any detailed information. We also coded 1 those 
who sent a link only to their website (unless the organization chart, as defined above, is on 
the homepage) or those who only made general reference to the website. [lesser compliance] 
 2: Link or background. We coded 2 those parish councils which replied to the request by 
email with links directly to the organization chart or background data (where the information 
must be clearly visible by clicking the link they provided) or provided a generic link along 
with exact instructions where to find the information. [partial compliance] 
 3: Send chart. We coded 3 those parish councils which provided the organization chart 
itself, whether as an attachment or in the body of the email. [full compliance] 
 4: Make public. We coded 4 those parish councils which sent us the organization chart and 
which explicitly stated the intent to publish it in the public domain as a result of our request 
(in the website, in notice boards, minutes) or where it was already public.[concordance] 
 
This scale was re-operationalized into two dichotomous variables, measuring 
respectively minimal legal compliance and concordance in order to test the relative effect of 
an FOI request compared with an ‘ask’. Compliance was measured with a dichotomous 
variable assuming value 1 for the category Give Location and Send Chart and value 0 for all 
the remaining categories. For concordance, instead, we associated value 1 to Make Public and 
value 0 to the remaining categories. 
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Results 
As with other studies using FOI, the overall response rate was low (Cuillier 2010; Michener 
and Rodrigez 2015). Before the experiment a 10 per cent response rate was estimated. Overall, 
637 parishes replied from a total of 4,312 contacted, a slightly higher than predicted successful 
response rate of almost 15 per cent, which is comparable with previous studies (Cuillier 2010).  
The high degree of non-compliance may be down to the fragile nature of parts of the requesting 
process, from the accuracy of e-mail addresses to the blocking or loss of requests in junk 
folders. Perhaps the most important reasons for the low response rate lies with the fact that 
parish clerks, working part-time with few resources, may simply find that answering an FOI 
may be ‘a long way down the list of pressing activities’ at a time of scant resources (Hunt 2010, 
49). 
However, taking this basic measure, parishes contacted through an FOI were more than 
twice as likely to respond than those that were simply ‘asked’, with 438 FOIs answered against 
199 asks: 20.62 per cent against 9.21 per cent. Cross-tabulation of the responses shows a 
statistically significant difference in the reply to a FOI request with respect to an informal ask 
(p. < .001). Table 3 contains the percentages for the different kinds of reply. Across each 
category, the FOI request is more effective than the informal ask. The relationships between 
each of these categories and all other responses are statistically significant when cross-
tabulated with the treatment (p. < .001).   
 
Table 3: Effects of Requests on Responsiveness 
Response Normal 
 (Treatment=0) 
FOI 
(Treatment=1) 
Total 
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This relationship is confirmed by the ordinal regression presented in Table 4. Model 1 
shows the results of the regression analysis (with standard errors clustered across counties), 
which controls for the current levels of transparency in the parish. Model 2, Model 3 and Model 
4 show the same regression analysis as in Model 1, but respectively add size as control variable 
and interaction terms between size and treatment and size and FOI. Size is used as a proxy for 
supply side differences such as resources available and FOI as a proxy of current openness. 
Unfortunately, the proxy used is available only for half of the sample. As can be seen, a 
statistically significant and positive relationship is present between the treatment and the 
dependent variable that is robust across different models. In other words, those parish councils 
that receive an FOI request are more likely to be more responsive than those that receive an 
informal ask. This finding shows that FOI requests trigger more responsiveness than non-legal 
asks: H1 finds empirical support.  
No reply (0)  
[Non-compliance] 
 90.79       79.65 85.23 
Reply (1) 
[Lesser compliance] 
4.63 8.36 6.49 
Link or background (2) 
[Partial compliance] 
1.44 2.60 2.02 
Send chart (3) 
[Full compliance] 
2.82 7.81 5.31 
Make public (4) 
[Concordance] 
0.32 1.58 0.95 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 2,160 2,152 4,312 
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H2 hypothesised that previous levels of transparency might affect parish councils’ 
current openness. Whether the parish council publishes an FOI publication scheme, expenses 
and minutes might affect its level of responsiveness. A statistically significant and positive 
relationship is present between the dependent variable and the level of previous transparency. 
However, this relationship is not robust across models: only the relationship between whether 
the parish council publishes expenses and the dependent variable remains statistically 
significant across models and its significance is also reduced. Surprisingly, whether the parish 
council already publishes an organization chart does not affect responsiveness. This finding is 
puzzling since those councils that already have an item of information available are presumably 
more aware of the law.9 This may, at least in part, be due to the fact that the law mandates that 
agencies notify the requester of the existence of already published information (e.g. through a 
web link) but does not ask that they supply the document itself. Finally, size is not statistically 
significant across models either. Consequently, neither the degree of pre-existing transparency, 
as a proxy for awareness, nor the size of a parish council, as a proxy for resources, influences 
responsiveness when interacted with the treatment. In conclusion, H2 and H3 are not confirmed: 
neither the pre-existing degree of openness of the parish council nor its size has significant 
effect on its responsiveness.10  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 We investigated whether having a chart on the website is correlated to any of the categories of the ordered dependent variable. 
We find that there is a significant relationship between having already the chart published and giving its location, and it is a 
positive one though, interestingly, there is no relationship is present between having a chart already and sending it. This may 
be down to the law itself in relation to previously published information, as described above. 
10 These results are confirmed also when we cluster standard errors according to shared clerks (see Table A3 in Appendix A) 
and when we use a different proxy for size (see Table A5 in Appendix A). Rrobustness checks using the other proxy for size 
show that findings are the same, regardless of the different proxy for size used in the analysis. The only different is that, when 
we use the other proxy for size, the treatment is significant in Model 3 only when interacted with the variable measuring 
whether the parish council has a publication scheme. 
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Table 4: The impact of FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness (Ordered Probit) 
     
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
FOI  0.123** 0.104 0.103 0.138 
 (0.0493) (0.0666) (0.0692) (0.121) 
Expenses 0.136** 0.163* 0.170* 0.163* 
 (0.0616) (0.0955) (0.0993) (0.0954) 
Minutes 0.135* 0.00513 0.000511 0.00520 
 (0.0709) (0.0445) (0.0466) (0.0445) 
Organization Chart 0.0592 -0.0160 -0.0125 -0.0156 
 (0.0494) (0.0731) (0.0732) (0.0733) 
Treatment 0.509*** 0.481*** 0.443*** 0.492*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0516) (0.0715) (0.0547) 
Size  0.162** -0.0447 0.161** 
  (0.0740) (0.187) (0.0727) 
Treatment#Size   0.341  
   (0.258)  
Treatment#FOI    -0.0554 
    (0.130) 
Cut1 1.501*** 1.374*** 1.350*** 1.381*** 
 (0.0805) (0.0738) (0.0835) (0.0829) 
Cut2 1.856*** 1.731*** 1.707*** 1.737*** 
 (0.0831) (0.0708) (0.0751) (0.0781) 
Cut3 2.009*** 1.870*** 1.847*** 1.876*** 
 (0.0901) (0.0728) (0.0785) (0.0787) 
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Cut4 2.851*** 2.719*** 2.697*** 2.726*** 
 (0.0910) (0.0740) (0.0775) (0.0777) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -2476.4247 -1349.0944 -1347.7167 -1349.034 
Observations 4,312 2,257 2,257 2,257 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The final test aims to provide insights into the area of compliance versus concordance. 
Table 5 shows the results of two probit models respectively on the variable measuring legal 
compliance and the variable measuring concordance. 11 As H1 suggests, FOI requests are more 
effective than an informal ask in both cases. 
The effect of an FOI request is stronger for concordance than compliance in relative 
terms. 12 It is possible to see the difference in responsiveness from the observed responses for 
each category: in terms of full (legal) compliance 9.2 per cent responded to the informal ask 
and 20.6 per cent responded to the FOI, so an FOI is 2.2 times more likely to elicit a response 
than the ask. For concordance, only 3.2 per cent responded to the informal ask and 9.4 
responded to the FOI, making the FOI three times more effective. By comparing the level of 
responsiveness in regressions, using the change in predicted probabilities, FOI requests are 
twice as effective as an ask for lower levels of compliance, but four times as effective as an ask 
for higher levels. The probability of compliance with an informal ask is 5 per cent, compared 
to a 10 per cent probability with an FOI request. The probability of concordance with an 
informal ask is 0.3 per cent whereas with an FOI request it is 1.4. FOI requests are more 
effective than informal asks, but effectiveness is not influenced by pre-existing openness or the 
                                                             
11 The variable measuring concordance can be conceived as measuring rare events. In this vein, we carried out robustness 
checks with various rare events logistic regression models. Results do not change from the analyses shown in the text. Rather, 
the effect of FOI requests on responsiveness is found to be stronger in absolute terms: see Table A7 in Appendix A. 
12 This is confirmed also in the robustness checks in Appendix A. The same analysis is run by using the other proxy for size 
mentioned above, namely the amount of council tax raised from the parish, and by clustering standard errors for clerks: results 
prove to be robust. See Appendix A Table A4 and A6. 
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availability of resources. Furthermore, FOI is more effective at the higher levels of concordance 
than it is at levels of compliance. 
Table 5: Parish Council Responsiveness to FOI - Legal Compliance and Concordance 
(Probit) 
 
 Legal 
Compliance 
Legal 
Compliance 
Concordance Concordance 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
FOI 0.144* 0.130 0.0376 -0.280 
 (0.0750) (0.0966) (0.204) (0.313) 
Expenses 0.110* 0.0750 0.0622 0.283 
 (0.0629) (0.123) (0.174) (0.234) 
Minutes 0.137* -0.00951 0.168 0.205 
 (0.0806) (0.0804) (0.130) (0.157) 
Organization Chart 0.108* 0.0382 -0.00512 -0.517 
 (0.0642) (0.104) (0.189) (0.361) 
Treatment 0.470*** 0.370*** 0.581*** 0.506*** 
 (0.0713) (0.0769) (0.141) (0.171) 
Size  0.367***  -0.249 
  (0.0850)  (0.402) 
Constant -1.901*** -1.729*** -2.872*** -2.773*** 
 (0.112) (0.0993) (0.180) (0.132) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1084.845 -593.754   ?????? ?????? 
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Observations 4,312 2,257 4,312 2,257 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Conclusions 
FOI requests do work when compared to an informal ask. Given the many potential pitfalls and 
criticisms, from politics to resources, this finding is important. As a system and policy, FOI 
carries numerous pitfalls and unintended consequences, but it is clearly superior to informal 
access. Parishes receive relatively few requests and would be likely candidates to seek to avoid 
the law, given their scant resources and low profile (Gofen 2014). Against the presumption of 
attention decay and entropy, FOI requests are relatively more effective at higher levels of 
concordance than at lower levels, a seemingly counter-intuitive finding. When compared to an 
informal ask, a FOI request becomes more effective than asking as it moves through the 
process, gathering rather than losing force as the requests move up graduations of compliance. 
FOI has an impact outside the boundaries but within the ‘spirit’ of the law. FOI requests, it 
appears, are not perceived by local authorities as mere legal instruments to be ‘minimally 
complied’ with, but carry some further weight, most likely support for the principle of openness 
seen in organisations elsewhere (Hunt 2010; Richter and Wilson 2013). The concordance is 
likely to be mutually reinforcing as a growing commitment to the principles of openness and 
shifting information flows within public bodies work together, a change identified in other 
local government studies in the UK (Richter and Wilson 2010; Burt and Taylor 2010). Rather 
than requests becoming lost amid internal bureaucracy, the bottleneck appears to be at the 
beginning of the chain. Emphasis should be on getting FOI requests over the first hurdle of a 
response. 
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Against the evidence from elsewhere, pre-existing levels of transparency did not 
determine the type of response, though publication schemes and website mentions represent an 
imperfect measure and others could be sought (Worthy 2013). Nor did size matter. While 
evidence from elsewhere points to larger and more resource rich organizations being generally 
more receptive, it is possible that the relative difference between parishes is simply too small 
to register (Roberts 2015). But it does show the responsiveness can happen right across the 
administrative system and is not confined to experienced authorities. 
However, the low response rate demonstrates how brittle the program logic of FOI may 
be in practice (Roberts 2015). While there is impressive evidence of a willingness to move 
beyond the law once a request is responded to, there may be serious difficulties with the area 
of minimal or less than minimal compliance (Richter and Wilson 2013). A complex mixture of 
technical and resource obstacles, not least the reliance of parishes on voluntary part-time 
administrators, can act as a powerful brake on the openness of a system at the point of a request 
arriving (Hunt 2010). As transparency legislation spreads across the world, this may offer food 
for thought in a country where the Act is generally held to be working well, and is often cited 
as one of the better examples of a successful FOI regime (Justice 2012; Worthy and Hazell 
2016).  
The findings offer a first insight into the workings of openness laws at the lowest level, 
furthest from the focus of the media and nearest to the community (Hazell et al. 2010). The 
findings did not, of course, tell us exactly why requests were responded to and what mixture 
of duty, diligence or obligation pushed the process. It may be that some bodies do view 
information interaction as an ‘inherently administrative task’ while others that see it as ‘a 
catalyst for organisational change’ or part of a ‘fundamental’ shift...within the democratic 
system’ (Burt and Taylor 2009, 185). Future research could examine how FOI fits as an 
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information channel within local organisations and how the law fits alongside more informal 
modes of communication. It also added to our understanding of FOI’s use as an experimental 
tool and its limitations. As with other attempts design was difficult, particularly as basic 
information was unavailable. Response rates were also low and demonstrated a varied 
understanding of the question and law, perhaps reflecting the different ad hoc or more 
formalised approaches to answering requests (Burt and Taylor 2009). In spite of these 
limitations, we have provided evidence that these transparency devices do work and give 
relevant information that can help governance and provide important democratic information 
to the public. 
 More experiments need to be done to extend the findings to other jurisdictions and 
levels of government. Future research could experiment with different requester identities and 
approaches, as tried elsewhere to examine whether, for example, a journalist, a campaigner or 
an aggrieved local resident obtained different levels of help or also use of varying approaches, 
from a physical letter to email (Cuillier 2010; Lagunes 2007). There could also be the 
opportunity to contact further the bodies to examine their experience and information 
environments and how FOI fits with the possibly local and informal ‘information ecosystems’ 
that exist (Kreimer 2008).  
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1: Parish Councils in the Sample 
County 
Number of 
parish 
councils Region Population 
Population 
Density 
(people per 
km2) 
Cornwall 212 South West 536000 151 
Devon 403 South West 1135700 114 
Somerset 403 South West 910200 154 
Dorset 273 South West 413800 163 
Gloucestershire 119 South West 598300 225 
Wiltshire 252 South West 684000 196 
Cumbria 267 North West 499800 74 
Warwickshire 208 West 545474 277 
Shropshire 148 West 473900 136 
Cheshire 217 West 1028600 439 
Staffordshire 187 West 849600 324 
Isle of Wight 33 South East 138400 364 
Surrey 81 South East 1135500 683 
Durham 40 North East 902500 332 
Northumberland 151 North East 316300 63 
Norfolk  381 East 859400 160 
Lincolnshire 474 East 104200 150 
Derbyshire 250 East 770600 303 
Yorkshire  924 East 5284000 343 
     
Total 5023    
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Table A2: Balance Tests 
Control Variables Control (0)  Treated 
(1) 
Total N 
FOI=0 50.27 49.73 100.0 3,533 
FOI=1 49.29 | 50.71 100.0 779 
Expenses=0 49.64 50.36 100.0 3,078 
Expenses=1 51.22 | 48.78 100.0 1,234 
Minutes=0 48.70 51.30 100.0 1,497 
Minutes =1 50.83 49.17 100.0 2,815 
Organization 
Chart=0 
49.97 50.03 100.0 3,810 
Organization 
Chart=1 
51.00  
 
49.00 100.0 502 
Size=0 49.58  
 
50.42 100.0 2,037 
Size=1  52.73  
 
47.27 100.0 220 
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Table A3: Ordered Probit FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness – SE Clustered by 
Clerks 
    
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
FOI  0.123* 0.104 0.177 
 (0.0678) (0.0953) (0.136) 
Expenses 0.136** 0.163* 0.169* 
 (0.0628) (0.0876) (0.0880) 
Minutes 0.135** 0.00513 3.61e-05 
 (0.0613) (0.0795) (0.0796) 
Organization Chart 0.0592 -0.0160 -0.0109 
 (0.0725) (0.0956) (0.0959) 
Treatment 0.509*** 0.481*** 0.464*** 
 (0.0520) (0.0685) (0.0790) 
Size  0.162 -0.0682 
  (0.107) (0.171) 
Treatment#Size   0.377* 
   (0.214) 
Treatment#FOI   -0.121 
   (0.162) 
Cut1 1.501*** 1.374*** 1.362*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0700) (0.0733) 
Cut2 1.856*** 1.731*** 1.720*** 
 (0.0590) (0.0744) (0.0767) 
Cut3 2.009*** 1.870*** 1.859*** 
 (0.0616) (0.0761) (0.0787) 
Cut4 2.851*** 2.719*** 2.710*** 
 (0.0842) (0.101) (0.103) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -2476.425 -1349.094 -1347.443 
Observations 4,312 2,257 2,257 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Probit FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness - Legal Compliance and 
Concordance - SE Clustered by Clerks 
 Legal 
Compliance 
Legal 
Compliance  
Concordance Concordance 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
FOI 0.144* 0.130 0.0376 -0.280 
 (0.0842) (0.121) (0.169) (0.277) 
Expenses 0.110 0.0750 0.0622 0.283 
 (0.0782) (0.110) (0.157) (0.212) 
Minutes 0.137* -0.00951 0.168 0.205 
 (0.0755) (0.0969) (0.174) (0.197) 
Organization Chart 0.108 0.0382 -0.00512 -0.517 
 (0.0900) (0.121) (0.178) (0.360) 
Treatment 0.470*** 0.370*** 0.581*** 0.506*** 
 (0.0645) (0.0846) (0.143) (0.177) 
Size  0.367***  -0.249 
  (0.124)  (0.380) 
Constant -1.901*** -1.729*** -2.872*** -2.773*** 
 (0.0717) (0.0858) (0.170) (0.174) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1084.845 -593.754 -220.477 -120.872 
Observations 4,312 2,257 4,312 2,257 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5: Ordered Probit FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness – Different Size Proxy 
    
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
FOI  0.123** 0.0728 -0.180 
 (0.0493) (0.0885) (0.181) 
Expenses 0.136** -0.00475 -0.00600 
 (0.0616) (0.0869) (0.0875) 
Minutes 0.135* 0.133 0.130 
 (0.0709) (0.142) (0.143) 
Organization Chart 0.0592 0.182** 0.173** 
 (0.0494) (0.0733) (0.0809) 
Treatment 0.509*** 0.596*** 0.521 
 (0.0471) (0.0967) (0.694) 
Size  0.0489 0.0509 
  (0.0300) (0.0640) 
Treatment#Size   -0.00198 
   (0.0760) 
Treatment#FOI   0.415** 
   (0.190) 
Cut1 1.501*** 1.937*** 1.896*** 
 (0.0805) (0.313) (0.615) 
Cut2 1.856*** 2.306*** 2.266*** 
 (0.0831) (0.324) (0.627) 
Cut3 2.009*** 2.464*** 2.424*** 
 (0.0901) (0.324) (0.612) 
Cut4 2.851*** 3.284*** 3.249*** 
  (0.0910) (0.400) (0.656) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -2476.425 -815.528 -813.411 
Observations 4,312 1,390 1,390 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6: Probit FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness - Legal Compliance and 
Concordance - Different Size Proxy 
 Legal 
Compliance 
Legal 
Complianc
e  
Concordanc
e 
Concordanc
e 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
FOI 0.144* 0.0265 0.0376 0.498*** 
 (0.0750) (0.115) (0.204) (0.164) 
Expenses 0.110* 0.00876 0.0622 -0.321** 
 (0.0629) (0.100) (0.174) (0.141) 
Minutes 0.137* 0.232 0.168 -0.0108 
 (0.0806) (0.185) (0.130) (0.208) 
Organization Chart 0.108* 0.107 -0.00512 0.481*** 
 (0.0642) (0.124) (0.189) (0.100) 
Treatment 0.470*** 0.550*** 0.581*** 0.711*** 
 (0.0713) (0.101) (0.141) (0.260) 
Size  0.0510  -0.0591 
  (0.0347)  (0.0992) 
Constant -1.901*** -2.431*** -2.872*** -2.358** 
 (0.112) (0.289) (0.180) (1.143) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1084.845   -348.593 -220.477 -74.834   
Observations 4,312 1,390 4,312 1,390 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7: Probit FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness - Legal Compliance and 
Concordance – Firth logit 
 Legal 
Compliance 
Legal 
Compliance  
Concordance Concordance 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
FOI 0.279* -0.627 0.135 -0.627 
 (0.163) (0.641) (0.435) (0.641) 
Expenses 0.214 0.712 0.151 0.712 
 (0.155) (0.505) (0.403) (0.505) 
Minutes 0.300* 0.471 0.420 0.471 
 (0.153) (0.524) (0.401) (0.524) 
Organization Chart 0.215 -0.940 0.0926 -0.940 
 (0.172) (0.883) (0.463) (0.883) 
Treatment 0.969*** 1.247** 1.550*** 1.247** 
 (0.128) (0.488) (0.404) (0.488) 
Size  -0.277  -0.277 
  (0.874)  (0.874) 
Constant -3.482*** -5.595*** -6.007*** -5.595*** 
 (0.148) (0.546) (0.457) (0.546) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1072.231 -116.660   -214.064 -116.660   
Observations 4,312 2,257 4,312 2,257 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B 
Treatment Letter 
From: Making Parishes Better Places 
RE: FOI Request 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
We represent a group called Making Parishes Better Places contacting you as part of a research 
project examining the impact of FOI on openness in local government. As part of our commitment to 
opening up parishes we ask under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 for a copy of an organisation 
chart detailing the structure of the council and the committee membership for *. Please email it to: #. 
In line with the government’s 2015 Local Government Transparency Code, we also ask that you 
publish the information on the homepage of your own website or, if you do not have a website, 
display it in a public place or note it in your meeting minutes. 
 
If you have time, please let us know what you intend to do: * 
 
Please contact us if you require further clarification at #. 
 
Yours Faithfully, 
 
Making Parishes Better Places 
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Control Letter 
From: Making Parishes Better Places 
RE: Request 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
We represent a group called Making Parishes Better Places contacting you as part of a research 
project examining the openness in local government. As part of our commitment to opening up 
parishes we ask you for a copy of an organisation chart detailing the structure of the council and the 
committee membership for *. Please email it to: #. 
Please note that this is not an FOI request. 
 
In line with the government’s 2015 Local Government Transparency Code, we also ask that you 
publish the information on the homepage of your own website or, if you do not have a website, 
display it in a public place or note it in your meeting minutes. 
 
If you have time, please let us know what you intend to do: * 
 
Please contact us if you require further clarification at #. 
 
Yours Faithfully, 
 
 
Making Parishes Better Places 
 
 
 
 
 
 
